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Add X.509 formatting validation to SECURITY.md

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Clarify that strict formatting of X.509 certificates is not checked by
Mbed TLS and that it therefore should not be used to construct a CA.

Signed-off-by: David Horstmann <[email protected]>
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David Horstmann
2025-01-22 14:34:09 +00:00
parent 32fe8f3cf1
commit 110e5341eb
1 changed files with 14 additions and 0 deletions
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SECURITY.md
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@@ -135,3 +135,17 @@ Guide](docs/architecture/alternative-implementations.md) for more information.
- Use cryptographic mechanisms that are not based on block ciphers. In
particular, for authenticated encryption, use ChaCha20/Poly1305 instead of
block cipher modes. For random generation, use HMAC\_DRBG instead of CTR\_DRBG.
#### Formatting of X.509 certificates and certificate signing requests
When parsing X.509 certificates and certificate signing requests (CSRs),
Mbed TLS does not check that they are strictly compliant with X.509 and other
relevant standards. In the case of signed certificates, the signing party is
assumed to have performed this validation (and the certificate is trusted to
be correctly formatted as long as the signature is correct).
Similarly, CSRs are implicitly trusted by Mbed TLS to be standards-compliant.
**Warning!** Mbed TLS must not be used to sign untrusted CSRs unless extra
validation is performed separately to ensure that they are compliant to the
relevant specifications. This makes Mbed TLS on its own unsuitable use in a
Certificate Authority (CA).