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Merge pull request #10853 from nvxbug/tls12-session-id-bounds-3.6

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Backport 3.6: Reject out-of-bounds session ID length in ssl_tls12_session_load
This commit is contained in:
Valerio Setti
2026-08-03 14:24:00 +00:00
committed by GitHub
parent f4a1aceb8c 61a2877a8e
commit 35bc09db98
4 changed files with 74 additions and 14 deletions
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ChangeLog.d/serialized-data-load-hardening.txt
+4
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
Bugfix
* Reject serialized TLS 1.2 sessions whose session ID length exceeds 32,
instead of accepting an out-of-range length that is later used to read
past the end of the 32-byte session ID buffer.
library/ssl_tls.c
+3
View File
@@ -3652,6 +3652,9 @@ static int ssl_tls12_session_load(mbedtls_ssl_session *session,
}
session->id_len = *p++;
if (session->id_len > sizeof(session->id)) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}
memcpy(session->id, p, 32);
p += 32;
tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data
+13 -6
View File
@@ -3200,17 +3200,24 @@ depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3:MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS:MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_
ssl_serialize_session_load_buf_size:0:"":MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER:MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3
TLS 1.3: Session serialization rejects trailing data
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C
ssl_tls13_session_load_rejects_bad_serialized_data:MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT:TEST_TLS13_SESSION_LOAD_TRAILING_DATA
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3:MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C
ssl_session_load_rejects_bad_serialized_data:MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3:MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT:TEST_SESSION_LOAD_TRAILING_DATA
TLS 1.3: Session serialization rejects hostname without terminator
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION
ssl_tls13_session_load_rejects_bad_serialized_data:MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT:TEST_TLS13_SESSION_LOAD_HOSTNAME_NO_NUL
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3:MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION
ssl_session_load_rejects_bad_serialized_data:MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3:MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT:TEST_TLS13_SESSION_LOAD_HOSTNAME_NO_NUL
TLS 1.3: Session serialization rejects ALPN without terminator
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA:MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN
ssl_tls13_session_load_rejects_bad_serialized_data:MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER:TEST_TLS13_SESSION_LOAD_ALPN_NO_NUL
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3:MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS:MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA:MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN
ssl_session_load_rejects_bad_serialized_data:MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3:MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER:TEST_TLS13_SESSION_LOAD_ALPN_NO_NUL
TLS 1.2: Session serialization rejects out-of-bounds session ID length (client)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C
ssl_session_load_rejects_bad_serialized_data:MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT:TEST_TLS12_SESSION_LOAD_OOB_ID_LEN
TLS 1.2: Session serialization rejects out-of-bounds session ID length (server)
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C
ssl_session_load_rejects_bad_serialized_data:MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER:TEST_TLS12_SESSION_LOAD_OOB_ID_LEN
Test configuration of EC groups through mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves()
conf_curve:
tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function
+54 -8
View File
@@ -22,10 +22,11 @@
#define TEST_EARLY_DATA_NO_INITIAL_ALPN 6
#define TEST_EARLY_DATA_NO_LATER_ALPN 7
/* Mutations for ssl_tls13_session_load_rejects_bad_serialized_data */
#define TEST_TLS13_SESSION_LOAD_TRAILING_DATA 0
/* Mutations for ssl_session_load_rejects_bad_serialized_data */
#define TEST_SESSION_LOAD_TRAILING_DATA 0
#define TEST_TLS13_SESSION_LOAD_HOSTNAME_NO_NUL 1
#define TEST_TLS13_SESSION_LOAD_ALPN_NO_NUL 2
#define TEST_TLS12_SESSION_LOAD_OOB_ID_LEN 3
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && \
@@ -2889,9 +2890,10 @@ exit:
}
/* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3:MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
void ssl_tls13_session_load_rejects_bad_serialized_data(int endpoint_type,
int mutation)
/* BEGIN_CASE */
void ssl_session_load_rejects_bad_serialized_data(int tls_version,
int endpoint_type,
int mutation)
{
mbedtls_ssl_session session, restored;
unsigned char *buf = NULL;
@@ -2902,12 +2904,34 @@ void ssl_tls13_session_load_rejects_bad_serialized_data(int endpoint_type,
const unsigned char *string_to_corrupt = NULL;
size_t string_len = 0;
(void) hostname;
(void) alpn;
mbedtls_ssl_session_init(&session);
mbedtls_ssl_session_init(&restored);
USE_PSA_INIT();
TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_ssl_tls13_populate_session(
&session, 42, endpoint_type), 0);
switch (tls_version) {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
case MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2:
TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_ssl_tls12_populate_session(
&session, 0, endpoint_type, NULL), 0);
/* Sentinel session ID so we can locate the length byte later.
* The detection code below relies on id_len being exactly
* sizeof(session.id), so force it. */
memset(session.id, 0x5A, sizeof(session.id));
session.id_len = sizeof(session.id);
break;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
case MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3:
TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_ssl_tls13_populate_session(
&session, 42, endpoint_type), 0);
break;
#endif
default:
TEST_FAIL("unsupported TLS version");
}
TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ssl_session_save(&session, NULL, 0, &len),
MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
@@ -2922,7 +2946,7 @@ void ssl_tls13_session_load_rejects_bad_serialized_data(int endpoint_type,
bad_len = len;
switch (mutation) {
case TEST_TLS13_SESSION_LOAD_TRAILING_DATA:
case TEST_SESSION_LOAD_TRAILING_DATA:
bad_len = len + 1;
buf[len] = 0;
break;
@@ -2937,6 +2961,28 @@ void ssl_tls13_session_load_rejects_bad_serialized_data(int endpoint_type,
string_len = sizeof(alpn);
break;
case TEST_TLS12_SESSION_LOAD_OOB_ID_LEN:
/* The format writes [id_len][32 id bytes]; find the length byte
* that precedes the sentinel run and push it out of range. */
for (i = 1; i + sizeof(session.id) <= len; i++) {
size_t k = 0;
if (buf[i - 1] != (unsigned char) sizeof(session.id)) {
continue;
}
while (k < sizeof(session.id) && buf[i + k] == 0x5A) {
k++;
}
if (k == sizeof(session.id)) {
field = buf + i - 1;
break;
}
}
TEST_ASSERT(field != NULL);
/* Smallest value strictly greater than sizeof(id). */
*field = (unsigned char) (sizeof(session.id) + 1);
field = NULL;
break;
default:
TEST_ASSERT(0);
}